On the economics of the "meeting competition defense" under the Robinson-Patman Act

Documento de trabajoIn this paper we analyze the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination when competitive pressure varies across markets. In particular, we study the economic aspects of the Robinson-Patman Act associated with the “meeting competition defense.” Using equilibrium models, the main result we find is that this defense might be used successfully in cases of primary line injury precisely when it should not be used, namely when price discrimination reduces social welfare. This result obtains both when discrimination appears in the final good market and when it is used in the intermediate goods market. We also find that these results may drastically change under secondary line injury.The Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ECO2012-31626) and from the Departamento de Educación, Política Lingüística y Cultura del Gobierno Vasco (IT869-13